His M-2 carbine jammed or was hit by gunfire, his pistol had no bullets. One of his fighters helped Che climb a side of a ridge, where a bullet hit Guevara in the calf.
Halfway up, Bolivian Rangers confronted Che and demanded his surrender. Less than an hour into the battle the object of all the Bolivian efforts had fallen into their hands. In Washington the news was electrifying. CIA operative Rodriguez flew over La Higuera village, where Che had been taken, speaking to the Rangers over a short-range radio, confirming it was really Guevara. A Bolivian officer flew to the village by helicopter to interrogate the prisoner.
Rodriguez got a ride the next morning with the Ranger commander. The message would be late in transmission. Before it went out senior Bolivian officers decided that Guevara should be executed. Director Helms reported to NSC members on October 13 the code the Bolivians had used to send the order to kill Che and his fellow prisoners Document Che would be shot about pm on October 9. Before that CIA operative Rodriguez conversed with him for about two hours.
Director Helms circulated a summary of the conversation on October 13 Document Guevara discussed the Cuban economy, Castro—Che affirmed that Fidel had not been a communist before the success of the Cuban Revolution—his campaign in the Congo, prisoners in Cuba, and the guerrilla movement in Bolivia, which he predicted would resurge after his death. The next day Rostow told LBJ that the agency now had decrypts of January-February messages showing a direct link between Cuba and the Guevara operation in Bolivia.
So ended a revolutionary venture both bold and desperate. Che Guevara had returned to South America convinced he could set the continent alight, starting with a modest beginning in Bolivia. His band in Bolivia were pulled into action prematurely as a result of an early encounter with army troops.
But even at the end, even in death, Che remained confident that his spirit would one day re-ignite the revolution in Latin America. After visiting Bolivia and meeting President Barrientos, U. General William Tope assesses the guerrilla situation in the Andes, warning of major challenges ahead.
Fearing Bolivian incompetence, Tope concludes the telegram by highlighting the need for a significant U. In this sobering memo on the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Bolivian government, staffer William G. Both President Juan Carlos Ongania, of Argentina and President Eduardo Frei, of Chile agreed at a summit conference in Uruguay in April , that if Barrientos is overthrown and replaced with a left-wing leader like Juan Lechin Oquendo, they will intervene with their armed forces.
Debray reports seeing him. We have seen no evidence of successful recruiting efforts by the guerrillas … The present guerrilla movement can probably evade and harass the counterinsurgent forces for an indefinite period, but it does not in itself and at its present size constitute a serious threat to the government.
If the government should take harshly repressive measures against the miners, that coalescence [sic] might occur. However, Barrientos has not authorized such measures thus far and his chances of avoiding drastic action seem somewhat better than even. I think the President night like to read this one. Imperialism is the real enemy, not the oligarchies, which are enemies of form rather than substance. Because the real enemy is a common one for all of Latin America, a new strategy is necessary.
This strategy must start from the premise that in Latin America no single country can now or in the future carry out the revolution alone, not even a government supported by its own army and by its people. It would merely produce palliatives and imitations of change, but it would not make revolution. One country alone is quickly surrounded, strangled, and subjugated by the imperialists because revolution is a socio-economic fact and not a romantic, patriotic event.
Economic underdevelopment in Latin America is caused by imperialism and its total control. Change will be possible only when there is total opposition. Autocriticism is sometimes hard to take. A great deal of the fault lies with the Bolivians. But there are areas where we clearly fall down. The Bolivian guerrillas are a well trained and disciplined group. It could become a focus for the continuing polemical debate in the Communist world over the wisdom of political versus militant revolutionary action.
The concern is that the revelation of the U. The strategic value of the documents is assessed. Recommendations are that Bolivia only make public some documents and that La Paz should seek public assistance from the U. Option 3, in which Bolivia announces possession of captured documents and publicly asks the U. The U. The French press may charge we are out to get Debray, etc. In this memorandum for the president, Rostow explains two major developments concerning the Bolivian situation.
An army unit caught up with the rearguard of the guerrillas and killed 10 and captured one … two of the dead guerrillas are Bolivians and the rest either Cubans or Argentines. The other, reporting information from the interrogation of one of the guerrillas, gives an inside account of developments within the rebel band. The agency focuses on evidence related to the question of whether Che is actually in that country, which has been one of the major mysteries from the beginning.
The evidence includes two passports, identity cards, health certificates and photographs. The passports show a correspondence to fingerprints Argentine authorities gave CIA in and , and indicate that Che most likely went from Brazil to Bolivia in November The CIA report does not draw conclusions at this stage. The staffer worries the documents may be tarred as a CIA hoax, and recommends that Rostow approve a course of action under which countries other than the U.
State Department officials deem it essential that the documents be publicized before they are brought into the Organization of American States OAS. While U. The narrative is to account for where the materials being presented came from, how the Bolivian government dealt with them, and what they show.
The Bolivians are supposed to rewrite this exposition so it appears to come from them. The props are versions of the captured documents. Ambassador Henderson is ordered to present copies of the same material to Bolivian leader Barrientos and military strongman General Ovando, and to obtain from them a clear understanding that Bolivia will take complete responsibility and make no attribution whatever to the United States.
Gerald R. Ford Library, Gerald R. INR specifies that the Bolivian government will take complete responsibility for the documents but calls it an acceptable risk if circumstances oblige the United States to admit it has given Bolivia an opinion interpreting the material. Bowdler affirms that the unit which engaged the guerrillas is the same Ranger battalion the United States had helped train.
He reports that, before confirming the presence of Che Guevara among the wounded, the CIA wants to verify his fingerprints. The battle lasted through the afternoon and resulted in several guerrillas killed and two captured. Nightfall, according to this report, prevented the Bolivians from evacuating the prisoners and wounded from the highlands. In reality, the Rangers were awaiting instructions on whether to kill the rebels.
Bolivian military officers holding a press conference not only claimed Guevara had died of battle wounds, they revealed that his diary had been captured.
A French reporter recorded that the diary book was colored red and had been manufactured in Germany.
Another report noted the diary contained daily entries that had detailed events in his Bolivian guerrilla campaign. Helms noted the agency had received contrary information from its officer, Felix Rodriguez, who was with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. CIA reported that Che was taken alive, questioned for a short time to establish his identity, and then killed on the orders of Bolivian chief General Ovando. INR observes that Bolivia has been a testing ground for the foco theory of revolution.
The dominant peaceful line groups, who were either in total disagreement with Castro or paid only lip service to the guerrilla struggle, will be able to argue with more authority against the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis.
Helms affirms that Guevara refused to be interrogated but did not mind a conversation reflecting on recent history. Connel looked worried, but Guevara gestured toward the ring of men with rifles. New Word List Word List. Save This Word! See Guevara. The Motorcycle Diaries 38, ratings. Guerrilla Warfare 2, ratings. The Bolivian Diary 2, ratings. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War 1, ratings. Welcome back. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account.
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